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international Criminal triBunal 
for rWanDa
victims cRitiQue tHe ictR
In the fourteen years since the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) was established, it has made a num-
ber of decisions that have angered survi-
vors of the Rwandan genocide. As may be 
expected, many of these disappointments 
have been the direct result of acquittal 
judgments handed down in genocide cases.
This fragile relationship has become 
more strained in recent months due to 
the ICTR Appeals Chamber’s shocking 
move to acquit Protais Zigiranyirazo on 
November 16, 2009 (see judgment sum-
mary below). Zigiranyirazo, the brother-in-
law of the late Rwandan president Juvénal 
Habyarimana, was originally charged with 
participating in a joint criminal enterprise 
to kill Tutsis at Kesho Hill, as well as aid-
ing and abetting genocide in relation to the 
killing of Tutsis at a roadblock in Kiyovu. 
In 2008, Trial Chamber III found Zigirany-
irazo guilty and sentenced him to twenty 
years of imprisonment on one count and 
fifteen on the other count. In its recent 
decision, the Appeals Chamber reversed 
the Trial Chamber’s judgment after find-
ing factual and legal errors in the lower 
chamber’s assessment of Zigiranyirazo’s 
alibi. According to the Appeals Chamber, 
the prosecution was unable to show beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Zigiranyirazo was 
involved in the alleged killings and the 
Trial Chamber erred by shifting the burden 
of proof to the accused.
The unexpected move was followed by 
another on November 17, 2009, when the 
ICTR decided to acquit Father Hormis-
das Nsengimana. Nsengimana, a Catholic 
priest who was arrested in 2002 was origi-
nally thought to have been at the center of 
a group of Hutu extremists that carried out 
attacks in Nyanza in 1994. He has been 
accused of both direct and indirect killings, 
and among his alleged victims are a Tutsi 
priest and a judge. After a thorough exami-
nation of all the charges brought against 
Nsengimana, Trial Chamber I found there 
was insufficient evidence to indict him and 
ordered his immediate release.
As expected, the two acquittals have 
angered many in the survivor community, 
sparking protests from individuals as well 
as survivor organizations. The protestors, 
who gathered in front of the ICTR docu-
mentation center three days after Nsen-
gimana’s release, criticized the ICTR and 
called the acquittals “malpractices.” Oth-
ers, such as Jean de Dieu Mucyo, the 
Executive Secretary of the National Com-
mission for the Fight against Genocide 
(CNLG), have attributed the acquittals to 
the laxity of ICTR prosecutors. The CNLG 
and other similar organizations are of great 
value to the ICTR because they provide 
survivor witnesses to assist the prosecu-
tion. However, the recent judgments have 
caused many such groups to threaten to 
discontinue providing such services, which 
would significantly hinder the prosecution.
With pressure from survivor groups 
mounting, the ICTR is now in a delicate 
position. The decisions it makes in the 
coming months may have the power to 
considerably alter the ICTR’s future.
Shahroo Yazdani, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, wrote this 
column on the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda for the Human Rights 
Brief.
Protais ZigiranyiraZo v. the 
Prosecutor, case no. ictR-01-
73-a
On November 16, 2009, the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTR reversed the convic-
tions of Protais Zigiranyirazo for com-
mitting genocide and extermination as 
a crime against humanity in relation to 
events occurring at Kesho Hill in Gisenyi 
Prefecture, as well as his conviction for 
aiding and abetting genocide in relation to 
events occurring at the Kiyovu Roadblock. 
The judgment marks the first time that the 
Appeals Chamber has entirely acquitted 
and released an ICTR convict.
Prior to the events of 1994, Mr. Zigi-
ranyirazo spent twenty years in Rwandan 
politics, serving as a Member of Par-
liament and as prefect of two different 
regions. He traveled to Canada to study in 
1989 and returned to Rwanda in 1993 to 
work in business. “Mr. Zed,” as he became 
known, remained influential in Rwandan 
politics vis-à-vis the marriage of his sister, 
Agathe Kanzig, to President Habyarimana, 
whose apparent assassination was the 
immediate catalyst for the mass killing of 
Tutsis and moderate Hutus between April 
and July 1994. Zigiranyirazo’s Decem-
ber 2008 convictions by the ICTR Trial 
Chamber stemmed from three incidents 
in two separate locations, which resulted 
in the deaths of between 810 and 1,520 
persons. First, the Trial Chamber found 
that he traveled to a Tutsi refugee gathering 
on Kesho Hill, where he gave a speech to 
a group of officials, civilians, and Intera-
hamwe soldiers just prior to the killing of 
between 800 and 1,500 of the refugees. 
Zigiranyirazo’s involvement at Kesho Hill 
resulted in convictions on separate counts 
of genocide and extermination as a crime 
against humanity, earning him two concur-
rent twenty-year sentences. The prosecu-
tion also presented evidence at trial that 
Zigiranyirazo twice traveled to a roadblock 
at Kiyovu, near Kigali, where he aided and 
abetted acts of genocide by offering fire-
arms and providing instructions to soldiers 
there. Between ten and twenty people were 
killed at the roadblock. The Trial Chamber 
convicted him on one count of aiding and 
abetting genocide and handed down a third 
concurrent sentence of fifteen years. In 
relation to both incidents, the Trial Cham-
ber dismissed the alibi evidence raised by 
the accused.
On appeal, Zigiranyirazo challenged, 
inter alia, the Trial Chamber’s evaluation 
of alibi evidence presented by the Defense 
in relation to both the events at Kesho Hill 
and the Kiyovu Roadblock. In addressing 
this challenge, the Appeals Chamber began 
with a general discussion of the burden 
of proof in the assessment of alibis. Spe-
cifically, the Appeals Chamber explained 
that an accused does not bear the burden 
of proving an alibi beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but must simply produce evidence 
that he was not present at the time of the 
alleged crime; or, alternatively, he must 
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present evidence likely to raise a reason-
able doubt as to whether he was present. 
In the words of the Appeals Chamber, “[i]f 
the alibi is reasonably possibly true, it must 
be accepted,” and the Prosecution must 
then establish beyond reasonable doubt 
that, “despite the alibi, the facts alleged 
are nevertheless true.” In order to deter-
mine whether the Trial Chamber improp-
erly shifted the burden in a given case, the 
Appeals Chamber held that it must look 
for language suggesting, inter alia, that 
the Trial Chamber required the accused 
to “negate” the prosecution’s argument, to 
“exonerate” himself, or to “refute the pos-
sibility” that he could have been present 
when the crime was committed.
The Appeals Chamber then turned to 
the alleged errors relating to the Defense’s 
alibi evidence in regards to Kesho Hill. As 
stated above, the Trial Chamber found that 
Zigiranyirazo was present at Kesho Hill 
at some time during the morning of April 
8, 1994 and that he addressed a group of 
assailants just before the group launched 
an attack on Tutsis taking refuge at the site. 
At trial, the Defense presented testimony 
from nine witnesses who placed Zigirany-
irazo at the presidential residence at Camp 
Kanombe just outside Kigali at various 
times throughout the day of April 8, 1994. 
The Defense also entered evidence regard-
ing the distance between Kanombe and 
Kesho Hill to establish that it would have 
been impossible for Zigiranyirazo to be in 
both places within the relevant time frame 
at issue. In reviewing the Defense’s alibi 
evidence and the Trial Chamber’s treatment 
of that evidence, the Appeals Chamber 
found three errors. First, although the Trial 
Chamber correctly stated in its judgment 
that the Prosecution bore the burden of 
proof, the Appeals Chamber found that the 
lower court’s approach to the alibi evidence 
“indicate[d] that it placed a greater eviden-
tiary burden on Zigiranyirazo to establish 
an alibi than required . . . .” For instance, 
the Trial Chamber stated that the alibi 
evidence was “inconclusive,” that it “[did] 
not contradict [Prosecution evidence],” and 
that it “[did] not provide . . . an alibi.” In 
the Appeals Chamber’s opinion, these com-
ments established that the Trial Chamber 
“did not fully appreciate that Zigiranyirazo 
only needed to establish reasonable doubt 
that he would have been able to travel to 
and from Kesho Hill on the morning of 8 
April 1994, rather than establish his exact 
location throughout the day in Kanombe.” 
Second, the Appeals Chamber found that 
the lower court erred in failing to provide 
a “reasoned opinion” in relation to the fea-
sibility of travel between Kesho Hill and 
Kanombe, which was an issue of “crucial 
importance.” Finally, the Appeals Cham-
ber determined that the Trial Chamber 
committed error by improperly dismiss-
ing certain key alibi evidence offered by 
the Defense. Taken together, the Appeals 
Chamber found that the lower court’s 
reversal of the burden of proof, failure to 
provide a reasoned opinion on an issue 
critical to the Defense’s case, and mistreat-
ment of key evidence invalidated Zigirany-
irazo’s convictions in relation to the events 
at Kesho Hill.
Turning to Zigiranyirazo’s conviction 
for the events at the Kiyovu Roadblock, 
the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial 
Chamber committed the same three errors 
that it had committed in relation to the 
Kesho Hill convictions. First, the Appeals 
Chamber again found evidence that the 
lower court had shifted the burden of proof, 
citing language from the Trial Chamber’s 
judgment suggesting that Zigiranyirazo 
was required to “exclude the possibility” 
of his responsibility for the crime, rather 
than merely cast a reasonable doubt on 
the Prosecutor’s case. Second, the Appeals 
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber 
failed to consider, or at least failed to pro-
vide a reasoned opinion regarding, travel 
times between the roadblock and Rubaya, 
where Zigiranyirazo spent his nights dur-
ing the relevant period of time. Lastly, 
the Trial Chamber failed to consider “the 
evidence as a whole as well as the relevant 
circumstantial evidence” when evaluating 
the Defense’s alibi evidence, leading the 
Appeals Chamber to conclude that the 
lower court had misconstrued key facts 
in the case. Again, the Appeals Chamber 
found that, taken together, these errors 
invalidated Zigiranyirazo’s conviction.
Given the reversals of Zigiranyirazo’s 
three convictions, the Appeals Chamber 
did not address the Defense’s fifteen other 
grounds for appeal or the Prosecutor’s 
appeal for an extended sentence. Notably, 
while the Appeals Chamber has authority 
to remand any issue to the Trial Chamber, 
the present judgment in no way indi-
cates that the Appeals Chamber considered 
remand appropriate in this case. Upon the 
pronouncement of the Appeals Chamber’s 
judgment, Zigiranyirazo was released from 
the UN detention center in Tanzania, where 
he had been held since shortly after his 
arrest in Belgium in 2001.
Christopher Valvardi, a J.D. candidate at 
the Washington College of Law, wrote the 
judgment summary of Protais Zigiranyirazo 
v. The Prosecutor. Susana SáCouto, Direc-
tor of the War Crimes Research Office, and 
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director 
of the War Crimes Research Office, edited 
this summary for the Human Rights Brief.
the Prosecutor v. tharcisse 
renZaho, case no. ictR-97-31-a
On July 14, 2009, Trial Chamber I of 
the ICTR found Tharcisse Renzaho guilty 
of genocide, murder as a crime against 
humanity, rape as a crime against human-
ity, murder as a violation of Common 
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, and 
rape as a violation of Common Article 3 
to the Geneva Conventions. Renzaho was 
sentenced to life imprisonment.
During the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, 
Tharcisse Renzaho was both the prefect 
of Kigali-Ville prefecture and a colonel in 
the Rwandan army. As prefect, Renzaho 
was responsible for “peace and security in 
Kigali-Ville.” Furthermore, following the 
death of Rwandan President Habyarimana 
on April 7, 1994, Renzaho was appointed 
to a “crisis committee” established by 
the senior military command of the army. 
Renzaho left Rwanda in early July 1994 
and was arrested in September 2002 in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.
At trial, the Prosecution put forward 
evidence of a wide array of activities it 
believed supported its charges against Ren-
zaho, although the Trial Chamber dismissed 
several of the allegations. For instance, the 
Prosecution alleged that, because Ren-
zaho recruited and trained the Interahamwe 
militia between mid-1993 and July 1994, 
the accused bore responsibility for the kill-
ings and serious bodily and mental harm 
caused by the Interahamwe between April 
6 and July 17, 1994. However, while the 
Trial Chamber found evidence to support 
the claim that Renzaho encouraged cer-
tain students to join the Interahamwe and 
permitted the group to meet at his house 
for the purpose of receiving military train-
ing, the Chamber observed that support to 
a “youth organization” did not “in itself ” 
constitute a crime within the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. It further noted that no evi-
dence suggested that Renzaho “made state-
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ments against the Tutsis” in this context 
or that the “purpose of the training was to 
kill Tutsis.” In addition, the Trial Chamber 
found insufficient evidence to support the 
Prosecution’s claims that Renzaho ordered 
the killing of certain Tutsis living in Kigali, 
such as André Kameya, a journalist critical 
of the Interim Government.
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber found 
that evidence did support several others of 
the Prosecution’s allegations. For instance, 
the Trial Chamber found that Renzaho was 
responsible for the events occurring at a 
number of roadblocks that were used to 
identify Tutsis who were then captured or 
killed. Specifically, although it discredited 
evidence that Renzaho personally manned 
the roadblocks, the Trial Chamber found 
that the accused “ordered the establishment 
of and support to” the roadblocks, based 
primarily on evidence of his statements at 
public meetings and over the radio. Nota-
bly, while the evidence did not establish 
that the accused provided “explicit orders” 
to kill Tutsis at the roadblocks, it was clear 
to the Trial Chamber that Renzaho was 
aware that people were being killed at 
roadblocks “based on their ethnicity and 
political leanings” as early as April 10, 
1994. Thus, it concluded that the accused 
“was aware that the continued killing of 
Tutsi civilians was a likely outcome” of his 
orders to erect additional roadblocks. The 
Trial Chamber also found that Renzaho 
was involved in the killing of a number of 
Tutsis who had sought refuge in Kigali’s 
Centre des Etudes de Langues Africaines 
(CELA). In particular, the Chamber found 
that, on April 22, 1994, Renzaho super-
vised a “selection process” by which Inter-
ahamwe separated about forty Tutsis from 
the other refugees. Renzaho then sent the 
remaining refugees home, while the forty 
persons selected by the Interahamwe were 
killed. Similarly, the Chamber found that 
Renzaho bore responsibility for the kill-
ing of some forty to fifty Tutsis who had 
taken refuge in the Saint Famille Church, 
as the evidence established that Renzaho 
had been present at the church prior to the 
attack, had directed the Interahamwe to kill 
“many persons,” and later ordered them to 
stop the attack upon the approach of UN 
troops.
In addition to finding Renzaho respon-
sible for genocide based on his involve-
ment in killings of Tutsis, the Trial 
Chamber found that Renzaho’s role in 
several instances of sexual violence against 
Tutsi women supported the Prosecution’s 
charges of genocide, noting that genocide 
may be carried out by acts intended to 
cause serious bodily or mental harm if 
those acts are performed with the req-
uisite genocidal intent. The Court found 
genocidal intent behind the rapes charged 
in this case because of the surrounding 
circumstances, including the targeting of 
Tutsis and Renzaho’s comments encourag-
ing the rapes. For example, witnesses testi-
fied that Renzaho encouraged the rapes 
by saying Tutsi women were “food for the 
militiamen,” and telling his subordinates 
that it was “time to show Tutsi women that 
Hutus are strong and can do whatever they 
wanted to do with them.”
In terms of Renzaho’s individual crimi-
nal responsibility, the Chamber determined 
that he bore responsibility for each of the 
crimes relating to events at the roadblocks, 
CELA, and Saint Famille Church under a 
theory of direct responsibility for order-
ing and aiding and abetting the crimes, as 
well as under a theory of superior respon-
sibility, as Renzaho knew or should have 
known that people over whom he exercised 
authority were going to commit the rel-
evant crimes, but he did nothing to prevent 
the crimes. In relation to the crimes of sex-
ual violence, the Chamber determined that 
Renzaho was responsible under a theory of 
superior responsibility only. Interestingly, 
the Defense had argued that the Intera-
hamwe were so unorganized and undisci-
plined that it would have been impossible 
for Renzaho to effectively control them. 
However, the Chamber rejected this claim, 
finding that Renzaho was indeed in a supe-
rior-subordinate relationship with those 
who committed the crimes, not only by 
virtue of his military rank, but also due to 
his role as prefect of Kigali-Ville.
For sentencing purposes, the Prosecu-
tion submitted several aggravating factors 
for the Chamber’s consideration, including 
Renzaho’s breach of his duty to the popu-
lation, which derived from his position as 
prefect, and the duration and severity of 
his crimes. The Defense proposed that the 
Chamber consider Renzaho’s long history 
of public service, as well as evidence that 
he sheltered Tutsis in his house and tried 
to arrest wrongdoers, as mitigating cir-
cumstances. In weighing these factors, the 
Chamber gave significant weight to Ren-
zaho’s position as a civilian and military 
superior, holding that these increased the 
gravity of his crimes. Furthermore, while it 
recognized Renzaho’s background in pub-
lic service and his submissions concerning 
assistance to Tutsis, it afforded these fac-
tors “very limited weight” in light of the 
severity of his crimes. In determining that a 
life sentence was appropriate, the Chamber 
explained that the sentence was a single, 
global sentence encompassing punishment 
for each of Renzaho’s crimes, which was 
appropriate in the view of the Chamber 
because all of the offenses were a part of 
“a single criminal transaction.”
Aileen Thomson, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, wrote the judg-
ment summary of The Prosecutor v. Thar-
cisse Renzaho. Susana SáCouto, Director 
of the War Crimes Research Office, and 
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director 
of the War Crimes Research Office, edited 
this summary for the Human Rights Brief.
SpeCial Court for Sierra leone
cRoss examination of cHaRLes 
tayLoR
The Special Court of Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) resumed with the cross examina-
tion of Charles Taylor, the former Liberian 
President, on January 11, 2010. Taylor is 
currently charged with eleven counts of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
He has denied allegations that he supplied 
arms and ammunition to rebels in return 
for Sierra Leone blood diamonds and help-
ing Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
rebels plan operations in which they com-
mitted rape, murder, and amputations.
In early 2010, Brenda Hollis, Lead 
Prosecutor for the SCSL, questioned Tay-
lor about allegations made by actress Mia 
Farrow pertaining to a 1997 party in South 
Africa, which was hosted by Nelson Man-
dela and attended by Naomi Campbell, 
Mia Farrow, and other celebrities. The alle-
gations claim Taylor delivered a diamond 
to Naomi Campbell that he had received 
from the Sierra Leon junta regime. The 
Prosecutor argued the inclusion of these 
allegations would refute Taylor’s claims 
that he never received diamonds when he 
was in the Nation Patriotic Front (NPFL) 
or President of Liberia. The use of a 
document with these allegations reignited 
the ongoing battle over the use of fresh 
evidence during cross examination. The 
Judges disallowed the Prosecution from 
using the document in cross examination.
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In addition, the Prosecution used Tay-
lor’s four-month-long direct examination 
testimony to challenge Taylor on topics 
outside the indictment timeframe, in order 
to test Taylor’s credibility as a witness. 
Taylor was asked about his involvement 
in the 1985 coup to overthrow the then-
Liberian president, Samuel Doe; alleged 
money embezzlement; and the reason for 
his stepping down as Liberian president. 
During examination, Taylor said the 2003 
attack by Liberian rebels on an annex of 
the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia was what 
made him decide to step down as president. 
The Prosecution drew attention to the fact 
the attack occurred one month after the 
Accra peace talks, during which Taylor 
had indicated his willingness to step down 
as president. The Prosecution also alleged 
that in 1999, when the RUF rebels entered 
into negotiations with the government of 
Sierra Leone, Taylor advised his negotia-
tions team to ensure that the peace agree-
ment would benefit RUF rebels. However, 
Taylor denied the allegations.
In the second week of cross examina-
tion, Taylor denied several more of the 
Prosecution’s allegations, including that 
Taylor knew about RUF Commander Sam 
Bockarie’s threat in December 1998 to 
attack Freetown. The threat was carried 
out in January 1999. The rebels commit-
ted murders and rapes, burned houses, and 
amputated the limbs of civilians. The Pros-
ecution dismissed Taylor’s denial, arguing 
that as the point person for peace in Sierra 
Leone, he would have been aware of such 
threats. The Prosecution further alleged 
that Taylor was superior to RUF leaders, 
and he knew or had reason to know that 
the rebels were committing such atrocities. 
One of Taylor’s central defenses during his 
trial has been his stated role as peacemaker 
during the Sierra Leone war. Taylor main-
tains that in 1997 when he became Liberian 
president, the Economic Community of 
West African States made him head peace-
maker for the conflict in Sierra Leone, and 
that he did not know about RUF leader 
Sam Bockarie’s threats of attack.
As the Prosecution continues its cross-
examination of Charles Taylor, it will begin 
stepping away from demonstrating Taylor’s 
untruthfulness during his testimony and 
begin focusing on specific allegations such 
as the use of child soldiers, physical and 
sexual violence, and other acts of terrorism 
directed at civilians.
Laticia Sanchez, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, wrote this col-
umn on the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
for the Human Rights Brief.
Prosecutor v. sesay, Kallon, and 
gbao, case no. scsL-04-15-a
On October 26, 2009, the Appeals 
Chamber for the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone upheld the convictions of three 
former RUF leaders for crimes against 
humanity, violations of Common Article 
3 to the Geneva Conventions and of Addi-
tional Protocol II, and other serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law. The 
charges it upheld included those relating to 
forced marriage, the conscription and use 
of child soldiers in armed conflict, and 
attacks on UN peacekeepers. It reaffirmed 
sentences for Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, 
and Augustine Gbao of 52 years, 40 years, 
and 25 years, respectively. The Chamber 
dismissed 96 counts of appeal, noting that 
many of the Appellants’ grounds for appeal 
were vague, unsupported, and undeveloped. 
While the Appeals Chamber did grant one 
of Gbao’s grounds of appeal, overturning 
his conviction for collective punishments 
as a war crime, the acquittal on this single 
count did not alter Gbao’s overall sentence. 
Similarly, although the Appeals Chamber 
granted two of the Appellants’ claims of 
error in regards to sentencing, the findings 
of error did not require that the sentences 
handed down by the Trial Chamber be 
decreased.
Among the unsuccessful grounds of 
appeal brought by the RUF leaders was a 
claim that the Trial Chamber had erred in 
finding that Kallon acted with the requisite 
intent in relation to the crime of conscript-
ing and using children under the age of 
15 to participate actively in hostilities. 
Specifically, Kallon alleged that the Trial 
Chamber had improperly shifted the bur-
den of proof to the defense by holding 
that “where doubt existed as to whether a 
person abducted or trained was under the 
age of [15], it was incumbent upon the 
perpetrator to ascertain the person’s age.” 
In response, the Appeals Chamber first 
noted its previous holding that the prohibi-
tion on conscripting or using child soldiers 
existed in customary international law at 
the time the RUF leaders allegedly engaged 
in such conduct and that “a significant 
body of conventional international law 
imposes an obligation on parties to ‘take all 
feasible measures to ensure that children 
are not recruited or used in hostilities.” 
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber held 
that military leaders “are under a duty to 
act with due diligence to ensure that chil-
dren under the age of [15] are not recruited 
or used in combat,” and that “[f]ailure to 
exercise such due diligence to ascertain 
the age of recruits does not relieve an 
accused of his liability for their recruit-
ment or use.” Based on these findings, the 
Appeals Chamber rejected Kallon’s appeal. 
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge 
Renate Winter clarified that, in her view, 
the Chamber’s holding on this issue applied 
the mens rea applicable to the age of child 
soldiers codified in the Elements of Crimes 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
which requires that the perpetrator “knew 
or should have known” that the children 
were under 15 years old. While the ICC’s 
Elements of Crimes are in no way binding 
on the Special Court, Judge Winter never-
theless stressed that the standard applied 
by the Special Court was equivalent to the 
ICC standard.
Another challenge brought by Kallon 
was that the Trial Chamber had erred in 
convicting him of the war crime of inten-
tionally directing attacks against peace-
keepers. Noting that one of the elements 
of the crime is that the relevant “personnel, 
installations, material, units or vehicles 
were entitled to that protection given to 
civilians or civilian objects under the inter-
national law of armed conflict,” Kallon 
argued that the UN peacekeeping force 
in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, had “acted 
in a belligerent manner” toward the RUF, 
thus “stripping itself of any international 
protection accorded [to] civilians or peace-
keepers.” However, the Appeals Chamber 
agreed with the Trial Chamber that it 
was necessary to consider the “totality of 
the circumstances” to determine whether 
peacekeepers are entitled to the protec-
tion afforded to civilians and that, in the 
context of the RUF attack on UNAMSIL, 
the circumstances showed that the peace-
keepers did benefit from the protection 
afforded to civilians. In support of this 
finding, the Appeals Chamber noted that 
UNAMSIL was a peacekeeping mission 
(as opposed to a peace enforcement mis-
sion) that was authorized to use force only 
in certain exceptional circumstances; that 
the peacekeepers were only lightly armed; 
and that the peacekeepers did not engage in 
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hostilities or use force, except legitimately 
in self defense.
In regards to Gbao’s successful ground 
of appeal against his conviction for the 
war crime of collective punishments, Gbao 
argued that the Trial Chamber “failed to 
find that he held the specific intent required 
for collective punishment.” In its judgment, 
the Trial Chamber found Gbao guilty of 
the war crime of collective punishments 
based on the unlawful killing of 63 civil-
ians, which was done in the presence of 
several senior RUF members, including 
Gbao, for the purpose of “indiscriminately 
punishing civilians” perceived to be col-
laborating with the Civil Defense Forces. 
Based on a review of the facts, the Appeals 
Chamber agreed with Gbao’s submission 
that the Prosecution failed to establish 
Gbao had the specific intent to collectively 
punish the civilians who were killed, and 
thus overturned his conviction. Neverthe-
less, the Appeals Chamber upheld Gbao’s 
sentence of 25 years, noting “the particular 
circumstances of this case as well as the 
form and degree of the participation of 
Gbao in the crimes, and the seriousness of 
the crimes.”
Finally, with respect to sentencing, Kal-
lon and Gbao successfully challenged their 
cumulative convictions on the counts of 
extermination as a crime against humanity 
and murder as a crime against humanity. 
The Appeals Chamber agreed that the 
latter crime is fully subsumed within the 
former and thus held that convictions on 
both counts for the same underlying acts 
are “impermissibly cumulative.” Because 
the crime against humanity of extermi-
nation is the more specific offense, the 
Appeals Chamber held that the convic-
tions for the relevant killings would stand 
under extermination as a crime against 
humanity, but not under murder as a crime 
against humanity. The Appeals Chamber 
also agreed that the Trial Chamber “erro-
neously double-counted” evidence of the 
Appellants’ specific intent in relation to 
the war crimes of terrorism and collec-
tive punishments. Specifically, the Trial 
Chamber erred in considering the specific 
intent to terrorize or collectively punish 
as increasing the gravity of the underly-
ing offenses and, therefore, warranting the 
imposition of higher sentences, because the 
relevant intent is an element of the offense 
in regards to each crime. Again, however, 
the Appeals Chamber did not find that 
these errors warranted any reduction in the 
overall sentences determined by the Trial 
Chamber.
Laticia Sanchez, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, wrote the judg-
ment summary of The Prosecutor v. Thar-
cisse Renzaho. Susana SáCouto, Director 
of the War Crimes Research Office, and 
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director 
of the War Crimes Research Office, edited 
this summary for the Human Rights Brief.
extraorDinary ChamBerS in the 
CourtS of CamBoDia
fouR foRmeR kHmeR Rouge 
LeaDeRs cHaRgeD witH genociDe 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) have con-
firmed the inclusion of charges of geno-
cide in the case against four former Khmer 
Rouge leaders currently in detention. Nuon 
Chea, known as “Brother Number Two;” 
Khieu Samphan, the ex-head of state; Ieng 
Sary, the former foreign minister; and 
Ieng Thirith, the former minister of social 
affairs, were informed of the additional 
charges during meetings in December 
2009. The genocide charges refer specifi-
cally to the killing of Vietnamese people 
and members of the Cham Muslim minor-
ity group. In early January 2010, the Co-
Investigating Judges ruled that they would 
not bring genocide charges relating to 
another minority the Khmer Krom.
The four former officials are being 
investigated in Case 002 at the ECCC. 
The Co-Investigating Judges, You Bun-
leng and Marcel Lemonde, are expected 
to decide by September 2010 whether to 
indict the four former leaders and to settle 
the final charges, if any. The genocide 
charges have been added to earlier charges, 
including crimes against humanity and 
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention. 
The only other case at the tribunal, Case 
001 against Kaing Guek Eav (known as 
“Duch”) ended in November 2009; Duch 
was not tried for genocide. 
Although the mass killings under the 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia between 1975 
and 1979 are often referred to as genocide, 
academics have long debated whether they 
satisfy the legal definition. The 1948 UN 
Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Genocide defines genocide as the 
“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group 
as such.” The ECCC accepted the Conven-
tion’s definition of genocide for use in tri-
als at the tribunal. 
During its time in power, the Khmer 
Rouge systematically executed or caused 
the death of those they considered ideo-
logical enemies. The genocide charges in 
Case 002 refer to the killing of members of 
identified groups, which would fall under 
the ECCC’s definition of genocide. How-
ever, there is some debate about whether 
the regime had a specific intent to destroy 
those groups or if the intent was to elimi-
nate political opposition to the regime, 
which included these ethnic and religious 
groups. The definition adopted by the 
ECCC does not recognize the destruction 
of political groups as genocide.
In a filing to the Co-Investigating 
Judges, defense counsel for Ieng Sary 
asserted that the tribunal should use a 
“purpose-based” approach to determine 
intent in crimes of genocide rather than a 
“knowledge-based” approach. A knowl-
edge-based determination of intent would 
only require that the perpetrators knew 
their actions would lead to the destruction 
in whole or part of a defined group, while 
a purpose-based intent would demand that 
the perpetrators have the destruction of the 
group as a particular goal. 
The exclusion of genocide charges in 
relation to the Khmer Krom, ethnic Krom 
from the Mekong Delta region in Vietnam, 
could complicate an already intricate trial 
process. The Co-Investigating Judges ruled 
that the charges would not be brought for 
procedural reasons. According to the rul-
ing, the facts and geographic areas cited 
by the Prosecutors and civil parties were 
not included in either the introductory or 
supplemental submissions by the Prosecu-
tors, which is a requirement for expand-
ing the investigation. The lawyers for the 
Khmer Krom civil parties are expected to 
appeal the decision.
Amanda Chace, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, wrote this 
column on the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia for the Human 
Rights Brief.
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international Criminal Court
icc PRosecutoR ReQuests 
investigation into kenyan  
Post-eLection vioLence
On November 26, 2009, the Prosecutor 
for the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo formally requested 
that Pre-Trial Chamber II allow him to con-
duct an investigation into the post-election 
violence that occurred in Kenya between 
late 2007 and early 2008. In making the 
request, Moreno-Ocampo for the first time 
exercised his proprio motu powers as Pros-
ecutor under Article 15 of the Rome Stat-
ute. Article 15 provides that the Prosecutor 
can open an investigation and bring cases 
against a State Party to the Rome Statute if 
he is able to prove the existence of several 
criteria.
Moreno-Ocampo structured his request 
to demonstrate that the situation in Kenya 
met all relevant articles of the Rome Stat-
ute. First, Moreno-Ocampo sought to 
establish that the ICC has jurisdiction over 
the events in Kenya by providing evidence 
that the alleged crimes fit definitions in 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute such as mur-
der, rape, deportation, and other inhuman 
acts constitute crimes against humanity. 
Additionally, the events satisfy Article 11 
because they occurred after the Rome Stat-
ute came into effect in Kenya on June 1, 
2005, and they satisfy Article 12 because 
they occurred on Kenyan territory.
Second, Moreno-Ocampo argued that 
his request was admissible because Kenya 
is unwilling and unable to prosecute the 
matter itself as required by Article 17(1)
(a)-(c). As required by these provisions, 
Moreno-Ocampo established that no inves-
tigations had been conducted by Kenyan 
officials and none were likely to be under-
taken. In particular, the Kenyan Parliament 
defeated a motion to establish a special 
tribunal to investigate the violence and 
also refused to refer the matter to the ICC. 
Moreno-Ocampo argued that the events sat-
isfied the requirements of Article 17(1)(d) 
because the crimes are sufficiently grave 
to merit ICC intervention. By the time a 
power-sharing agreement was reached by 
Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga in February 
2008, there had been over 1,000 civilians 
killed, 900 documented cases of rape, and 
350,000 people displaced. In one particular 
incident, between 17 and 35 people were 
burned alive inside a church. Furthermore, 
Kenyan organizations, like the Kenyan 
National Commission on Human Rights 
and the Waki Commission, have compiled 
lists of individuals who may have directed 
the attacks, and these lists include politi-
cal leaders on both sides of the electoral 
dispute.
Although the Court has not yet estab-
lished what an investigation against the 
interests of justice would be, Moreno-
Ocampo argued that the investigation 
would not be against the interests of justice 
pursuant to Article 53(1). He reasoned in 
his request that, to open an investigation 
under Article 53, the Prosecutor must posi-
tively prove jurisdiction and admissibility, 
but the ICC may refuse to grant leave if it 
decides the investigation would be against 
the interests of justice. Moreno-Ocampo 
stated that no such conflict is apparent 
from available evidence, so the request 
should be accepted.
Around the same time that Moreno-
Ocampo submitted his formal request, he 
made a general announcement calling for 
victims of the violence to come forward 
and share their accounts with the Pros-
ecutor. He announced that the period for 
victims to make statements would last until 
December 21, 2009. This effort was com-
plicated by issues such as how to provide 
for the security of victims who come for-
ward. As a result, Kenyans have requested 
to extend the deadline and to disseminate 
information on ICC procedures so victims 
would be more aware of their rights in any 
further proceedings.
PRe-tRiaL cHamBeR DecLines to 
confiRm cHaRges against aBu 
gaRDa
On October 19, 2009, a confirmation 
hearing began in the case of Prosecu-
tor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda before an 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber. Abu Garda is the 
Chairman and General Coordinator of Mil-
itary Operations of the United Resistance 
Front, a rebel group fighting the Sudanese 
government. He is the first accused from 
the Darfur situation to appear before the 
ICC. The hearing addressed allegations 
from a summons issued in May 2009 
that Abu Garda commanded an attack on 
peacekeepers of the African Union Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS) at Haskanita in Northern 
Darfur on September 29, 2007. As a result 
of the attack, twelve AMIS soldiers were 
killed, eight were wounded, and AMIS 
equipment was destroyed.
Specifically, the Prosecutor brought 
three charges against Abu Garda: vio-
lence against life, in the form of murder, 
whether committed or attempted; inten-
tionally directing attacks against personnel, 
installations, materials, units, and vehicles 
involved in a peacekeeping mission; and 
pillaging. ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo explained at a press conference 
that, while several attacks had been perpe-
trated against peacekeepers, charges were 
filed against Abu Garda for the Haskanita 
attack because of its far-reaching con-
sequences. He said, “[W]ith the killings 
[the peacekeepers] had to withdraw [from 
Haskanita], leaving thousands of civilians 
unprotected. The attack had consequences 
for the delivery of humanitarian aid as well 
as safety and security in the region.”
The purpose of the confirmation hear-
ing was to evaluate whether the Prosecutor 
had gathered sufficient evidence for the 
ICC to find Abu Garda guilty if the case 
proceeds to trial. First, opening statements 
were made by the Prosecutor, Defense, and 
four representatives of 78 identified vic-
tims who had applied. Next, the Prosecu-
tor presented documentary evidence and 
elicited testimony from three witnesses. 
The Defense then had an opportunity to 
challenge the Prosecutor’s evidence and 
witnesses, and present its own. Defense 
counsel sought to establish that Abu Garda 
was not present in Sudan at the time of 
the attacks and instead was traveling else-
where in Africa on behalf of the Justice 
and Equality Movement, another rebel 
group with which he was formerly affili-
ated. Additionally, the Defense argued that 
he did not order the attack and in fact 
condemned it. After both sides presented 
their evidence and witnesses, the victim 
representatives had an opportunity to chal-
lenge anything that affected their clients’ 
interests. Finally, the Prosecutor, Defense, 
and the victim representatives made clos-
ing arguments. The hearing concluded on 
October 30, 2009.
On February 8, 2010, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber entered a decision in which it 
declined to confirm the charges against 
Abu Garda. The Chamber concluded that 
the attack on Haskanita was sufficiently 
grave to merit ICC involvement because 
the violence caused AMIS to decrease its 
presence in the region and led to further 
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instability. However, the Chamber did not 
find that the Prosecutor had entered enough 
evidence to create “substantial grounds” on 
which to find Abu Garda guilty for the 
crimes of which he was accused. The Pros-
ecutor now has several options for how to 
proceed. He can resubmit his request for 
confirmation of charges with additional 
evidence, or he can petition the Pre-Trial 
Chamber for leave to appeal the decision 
on the evidence as entered.
Paul Rinefierd, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, wrote these 
columns on the International Criminal 
Court for the Human Rights Brief.
icc aPPeaLs cHamBeR ReveRses 
PRe-tRiaL cHamBeR ii Decision to 
ReLease Jean-PieRRe BemBa gomBo
On December 2, 2009, the Appeals 
Chamber for the ICC reversed Pre-Trial 
Chamber II’s August 14 decision granting 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo interim release. 
The Appeals Chamber unanimously agreed 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber “misappreci-
ated and disregarded relevant facts” in 
concluding that substantial changes in 
Bemba’s circumstances justified condi-
tional interim release. More importantly, 
the Court specified the conditions required 
to grant interim release. It determined that 
interim release must be a “single unsever-
able decision” that fully states the specific 
conditions for release. In addition, the 
Court required the identification of a host 
country willing to take responsibility for 
the defendant before interim release is 
granted.
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo is a Congo-
lese national charged with war crimes and 
crimes against humanity for his actions as 
military commander in the Central African 
Republic in 2002 and 2003. He has been in 
ICC custody since 2008 and will stand trial 
April 2010.
Pre-Trial Chamber II determined in 
August 2009 that Bemba no longer ful-
filled the requirements of Article 58(1) of 
the Rome Statute, which requires that a 
defendant be kept in custody prior to trial 
to ensure his appearance at trial. The rea-
sons for keeping someone in custody are to 
prevent harm to witnesses and victims and 
to prevent the defendant from committing 
additional related crimes. Judge Ekaterina 
granted Bemba interim release pending a 
host country’s willingness to take him. This 
decision was based on reduced charges and 
good behavior. However, without a willing 
host country Bemba’s release was illusory 
at best. The Appeals Court’s requirement 
that a host country be identified in order to 
consider interim release resolves the issue 
that Bemba’s possible release created. The 
Court stressed that without state coopera-
tion, a conditional release would be inef-
fective. While Bemba will not be granted 
release at this time, the Appeals Chamber’s 
decision clarified the requirements needed 
for interim release for defendants.
seconD congoLese waRLoRD tRiaL 
Resumes
The ICC trial of Congolese warlords 
Germain Katanga and Matthieu Ngud-
jolo Chui resumed on January 26, 2010. 
Originally set to start in September 2009, 
the ICC decided to postpone the proceed-
ings to allow for more investigation and 
was then forced to postpone the proceed-
ings again when Judge Christine Van den 
Wyngaert was injured in a bicycle accident 
on December 2, 2009. The Prosecutor v. 
Katanga and Ngudjolo is the second trial 
for the ICC and is a unique case that will 
present many challenges for the Court. 
William Pace, Convenor of the Coali-
tion for the International Criminal Court, 
explained that “the Court will deal with 
two accused, two defense teams, multiple 
charges, and more participating victims 
than in the Lubanga trial.”
Germain Katanga and Matthieu Ngud-
jolo Chui are jointly accused of seven war 
crimes and three crimes against humanity 
committed in the village of Bogoro in the 
Ituri district of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) from January through 
March 2003. According to Human Rights 
Watch, Katanga and Ngudjolo purposely 
attacked the village with the goal of eradi-
cating the Hema population in the area. In 
addition to attacking civilians, the defen-
dants are charged with murder, rape, sexual 
slavery, pillaging, destruction of property, 
and using child soldiers.
Due to length of the proceedings and 
the large numbers of victims, this case 
is unique for the ICC and will be closely 
followed in the DRC. The Rome Statute 
of the ICC allows victims to actively par-
ticipate in trial by voicing their concerns 
and opinions in proceedings that affect 
their personal interests provided they do 
not violate the defendants’ rights to a fair 
trial. In the Katanga and Ngudjolo trial, 
the Court has granted victim status for 345 
applicants; however, all except for a small 
group of child soldiers will be represented 
by a common legal representative. Paulina 
Vega, Interim Director at the International 
Justice Desk at the International Federation 
for Human Rights, praises the courts for 
allowing so many victims to participate in 
the trial, but wonders if “a single legal rep-
resentative for the larger group of victims 
will not fail to guarantee their meaningful 
participation.” Allowing victims to partici-
pate in the trial hopefully satisfies victims’ 
need for justice and closure, which are 
important goals for the ICC. Although the 
Katanga and Ngudjolo trial will present 
numerous procedural challenges, hopefully 
it will be fair and meet victims’ expecta-
tions as well.  HRB
Rebecca Williams, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, wrote these 
columns on the International Criminal 
Court for the Human Rights Brief.
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